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Abstract
Introduction: Hurricane Katrina, a Category 3 hurricane, made landfall in
August 2005. Approximately 1,500 deaths have been directly attributed to the
hurricane, primarily in Louisiana and Mississippi. In New Orleans,
Louisiana, most of the healthcare infrastructure was destroyed by flooding,
and >200,000 residents became homeless. Many of these internally displaced
persons received transitional housing in trailer parks (“villages”) under the aus-
pices of the [US] Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Problem: The FEMA villages are isolated from residential communities, lack
access to healthcare services, and have become unsafe environments. The trail-
ers that house families have been found to be contaminated with formaldehyde.
Methods: The Children’s Health Fund, in partnership with the Mailman
School of Public Health at Columbia University, began a program
(“Operation Assist”) to provide health and mental health services within a
medical home model. This program includes the Baton Rouge Children’s
Health Project (BRCHP), which consists of two mobile medical units (one
medical and one mental health). Licensed professionals at the FEMA villages
and other isolated communities provide care on these mobile units. Medical
and psychiatric diagnoses from the BRCHP are summarized and case
vignettes presented.
Results: Immediately after the hurricane, prescription medications were dif-
ficult to obtain. Complaints of headache, nosebleeds, and stomachache were
observed at an unusually frequent degree for young children, and were poten-
tially attributable to formaldehyde exposure. Dermatological conditions
included eczema, impetigo, methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) abscesses, and tinea corporis and capitis. These were especially dif-
ficult to treat because of unhygienic conditions in the trailers and ongoing
formaldehyde exposure. Signs of pediatric under-nutrition included anemia,
failure to thrive, and obesity. Utilization of initial mental health services was
low due to pressing survival needs and concern about stigma. Once the men-
tal health service became trusted in the community, frequent diagnoses for
school-age children included disruptive behavior disorders and learning prob-
lems, with underlying depression, anxiety, and stress disorders. Mood and
anxiety disorders and substance abuse were prevalent among the adolescents
and adults, including parents.
Conclusions: There is a critical and long-term need for medical and mental
health services among affected populations following a disaster due to natur-
al hazards. Most patients required both medical and mental health care,
which underscores the value of co-locating these services.
Madrid PA, Sinclair H, Bankston AQ, Overholt S, Brito A, Domnitz R,
Grant R: Building integrated mental health and medical programs for vul-
nerable populations post-disaster: Connecting children and families to a
medical home. Prehosp Disast Med 2008;23(4):314–321.
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Introduction 
This report describes the development and implementation
of a program designed to meet the medical and mental
health needs of children and families affected by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. The Baton Rouge Children’s Health
Project (BRCHP) uses two mobile units to provide a med-
ical home for the internally displaced persons relocated to
Baton Rouge, Louisiana and the surrounding areas. The
BRCHP’s service delivery model assures that health care is
comprehensive, continuous, culturally sensitive, and family
centered.1 This mobile health program is one of three that
form part of “Operation Assist,” a collaboration between
The Children’s Health Fund and the National Center for
Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University. Initial clini-
cal findings and recommendations for post-disaster service
development and delivery are presented.
Background
Early in the morning of 29 August 2005, Hurricane
Katrina made landfall on the Louisiana/Mississippi border
as a Category 3 hurricane. The storm surge caused the
breach of New Orleans’ protective levees, and 80% of the
city was flooded.2 More than 1,500 deaths have been
attributed directly to Hurricane Katrina, and the resulting
flooding and destruction caused the largest internal dis-
placement of people in United States history. Following the
storm, an estimated 1.3 million people had to leave their
homes and communities. As of March 2007, >200,000 for-
mer New Orleans residents remained displaced. This scope
of displacement and homelessness is similar to that seen in
Indonesia two years after the tsunami and in Ethiopia due
to the ongoing drought.3
In the New Orleans community most affected by
Hurricane Katrina, the lower Ninth Ward, 36% of residents
were poor prior to Hurricane Katrina.4 Among the 50
states and the District of Columbia, Louisiana’s poverty
rate (19.4%) was the second highest, exceeded only by
Mississippi’s poverty rate (21.6%).The poverty rate in New
Orleans was higher (28%). More than half of the poor New
Orleans residents (54%) lacked independent transporta-
tion, which greatly limited their ability to evacuate the city
when evacuation became necessary.5 More than 70% of the
city’s housing units were damaged, with an estimated cost
of $14 billion.6
Virtually the city’s entire healthcare system was dam-
aged or destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Charity Hospital,
the area’s only Level-1 Trauma Center, was flooded and all
paper medical records were destroyed. By February 2006,
there were 80% fewer hospital beds than prior to Hurricane
Katrina. Additionally, as of March 2007, more than 18
months after Katrina, there were <50 psychiatric hospital
beds in New Orleans.This represents 17% of pre-hurricane
capacity.7 Only 10% of the city’s 200 psychiatrists contin-
ued to practice in New Orleans. About three-fourths of the
city’s other safety net clinics were no longer functioning,
and those that had reopened, were operating with limited
capacity.8–10 Pharmacies were closed, making medications,
including those for chronic conditions such as diabetes,
asthma, and hypertension, difficult to obtain.11 The critical
shortage of healthcare providers was exacerbated by the
protracted housing shortage and delays in repairing resi-
dential infrastructure, making it difficult, if not impossible,
for evacuated and displaced health professionals to return
to New Orleans.12 
The city of Baton Rouge absorbed the highest percent-
age of people displaced internally within the state of
Louisiana.13 The delay or inability of government agencies
to address ongoing problems of displacement and isolation
among evacuees in Baton Rouge and other transitional
housing sites continues to extend the physical health and
mental health impact of this disaster.3,14 The slow and
poorly managed response of federal, state, and local agencies
has been well-documented and continues to be a significant
factor undermining the area’s recovery.15 As a consequence,
affected individuals consistently re-experience aspects of
the initial trauma related to the disaster (continuing loss of
possessions and basic necessities, separation from family
and friends, isolation from community, and loss of control
over one’s living situation), and exacerbates the disaster’s
psychological impact.16
Findings of health and mental health surveys from
evacuee children and families, some of which had been use-
ful in anticipating service needs, are discussed. The process
of developing programs to meet these extreme needs in
Baton Rouge is reviewed.
Impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on Louisiana
Evacuee Families
Several studies have presented demographic and health
service needs of specific evacuee populations. Shortly after
Hurricane Katrina, adults in a large congregate shelter in
Houston, Texas were surveyed. More than 90% were
African-American (compared to 67% for the New Orleans
population), and approximately 60% had an annual income
<US$20,000.17 Other shelter surveys have described the
post-hurricane level of healthcare need among sheltered
Katrina evacuees. In Oklahoma, where families with chil-
dren were included in the survey, 63% of households had at
least one missing household member. Fifty-six percent of
the adults reported having at least one chronic health con-
dition, and 14% reported having a pre-hurricane psychi-
atric illness that required medication. One child in five
(21%) was reported to have a chronic health condition.18 In
Austin, Texas, 50% of the adults arrived in their shelter
with an acute illness and 59% reported having a chronic
health condition.19
A survey of Louisiana evacuee children and families six
months post-Katrina found that 40% of the children had at
least one diagnosed chronic medical condition that
required medical management, and 19% of the children
who required prescription medication had not received
one. Nearly half of the children who had access to contin-
uous healthcare services before the storm no longer had a
usual source of care. Mental health problems were promi-
nent among children of storm evacuees and displaced fam-
ilies: 44% of parents reported new emotional or behavioral
problems affecting at least one of their children, and more
than half of the mothers scored in the clinical range for a
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The FEMA villages are desolate places, usually far
removed from public transportation, play areas, and any
semblance of a neighborhood or community. Families and
their children living in them generally do not feel safe.
Crime, including drug dealing, theft, violence, and prosti-
tution, have become ongoing problems.25 The trailers may
present unhealthy indoor environments. The Sierra Club
found that 83% of trailers at these sites had levels of
formaldehyde exceeding the minimal risk level for long-term
exposure.26 Formaldehyde is a carcinogen also associated
with allergic and upper respiratory symptoms. In particular,
it poses a higher health risk for children, especially those with
pre-existing respiratory conditions such as asthma.27,28 
The Baton Rouge Children’s Health Project
The BRCHP began as part of The Children’s Health Fund
ongoing service phase of “Operation Assist,” a disaster
response and preparedness program developed by The
Children’s Health Fund in collaboration with the National
Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University.
The BRCHP was developed into a permanent program of
The Children’s Health Fund in partnership with the
Louisiana State University Health Care System Department
of Pediatrics in Baton Rouge. This partnership with a local
medical facilitates patient access to subspecialty care when
needed, and provides local operational support and guid-
ance. In addition, the BRCHP networked with those com-
munity-based healthcare providers who remained in place,
both for continuity of care for patients and to best integrate
the program into the fabric of available health services.
The model of service delivery used by programs of the
Children’s Health Fund is a custom-designed, fully equipped,
state-of-the-art mobile medical unit staffed with physi-
cians, nurses, and mental health and social service profes-
sionals. The use of mobile medical units is an effective way
to bridge access barriers by making comprehensive health
care in a medical home model available at geographically
isolated residential and community sites.
The BRCHP uses a Mobile Medical Unit (MMU) and
a Community Support and Resiliency Unit (CSRU). Each
unit is a 38-foot recreational vehicle (known colloquially as
an RV) customized as a fully functioning pediatric clinic.
The BRCHP’s medical and mental health service delivery
focuses primarily on the Renaissance Village FEMA site
described previously. In addition, both mobile units were
providing service on a regular scheduled basis to a battered
woman’s shelter, to Early Head Start and Head Start pro-
grams, and to schools that have absorbed a large number of
displaced children.
The BRCHP MMU provides urgent and routine care to
children and young adults from birth through 24 years of age.
The decision to use 24 years as the upper limit for pediatric
patients was intended to ensure access for young adults who,
because of lack of health insurance, as well as other barriers,
otherwise would not have access to care. Prenatal care was a
frequently requested service, and has been incorporated into
the service model. Mental health services are provided by the
CSRU, customized with seating in the front to accommodate
family or group therapy, as well as an area in the rear that can
depression or anxiety disorder on a standardized measure.
Instability of government-provided shelter placements was
an issue that undermined efforts to re-establish stability
and normalcy. Families had been moved an average of 3.5
times during the first six months after the storm, a factor
that prevented school enrollment or consistent school
attendance for the children.20
In a follow-up study with the same cohort of sheltered
families shortly before the two-year anniversary of
Hurricane Katrina, 80% reported that their living situation
was worse than it had been prior to the hurricane.21
Investigators from Louisiana State University surveyed
sheltered evacuee adults in Louisiana nearly two years after
the hurricane and found that the over-representation of
African-Americans continued (73% compared to 19%
white and 8% other). More than half (55%) had lived ≥5
years in the residence that they had to evacuate. Since the
hurricane, 56% had been placed ≥3 shelters; 9% had been
in ≥5 shelters. Before Hurricane Katrina, 55% had full-time
jobs and 15% part-time jobs. Most of those who had been
unemployed were retired, disabled, or mothers caring for
their children at home. After Hurricane Katrina, more than
two-thirds were unemployed.22 
In the study conducted by Louisiana State researchers,
50% of interviewees felt that their current living situation
in the camps and trailers provided by federal agencies was
not safe for their children. This undoubtedly reflects the
continually deteriorating condition of the trailers as a shel-
ter and the isolation of the camps and trailer parks from
any established neighborhood or community service. Forty
percent reported continuing difficulty obtaining basic
necessities. Most striking in this survey are the findings
from the administration of a standardized depression
screening.The mean score was in the “major depressive dis-
order” range.22 
Post-Katrina Shelters: FEMA “Villages”
The surveys cited above were conducted with hurricane
evacuees generally sheltered at large, transitional housing
sites operated by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). These FEMA “villages” are open fields
generally filled with 200 to 216 square foot travel trailers,
most of which are intended for use as recreational vehicles.
Renaissance Village, the largest FEMA transitional hous-
ing site in Louisiana, houses approximately 1,600 Katrina
evacuees (including about 600 children) just outside of the
Baton Rouge city limits. Trailers are lined up in rows and
separated by gravel roads. There are no addresses, only des-
ignations by row and number, such as “C-10” or “J-18.” In
addition to the use of the trailer, the federal government
provides families with only water and sewer lines, and elec-
tricity.The families are responsible for providing everything
else.23 These trailers are considered “government-provided
temporary or transitional housing”. As such, the evacuee
families housed at these sites meet the federal definition of
“homeless”. However, none of the benefits guaranteed to
homeless families through the McKinney-Vento (Homeless
Assistance) Act are routinely provided to the families
housed in the FEMA villages.24
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amount of iron in the child’s diet and the provision of sup-
plemental iron. For most of these families, there was a clear
history of inadequate access to healthy food. Other signs of
under-nutrition in this population were obesity and failure
to thrive. In the FEMA villages, many reported that they
were fearful of using the propane stoves available in the
trailers. Some propane stoves had exploded, and some
leaked propane into the trailer interiors when used.
Assuming families wanted to use the stoves, the cost of
propane (approximately US$22 per container) potentially
was prohibitive. Many families relied on microwavable or
pre-prepared foods; however, distance from the shelter to
the nearest food store was a potential barrier to obtaining
more nutritious foods.
Propane also was required in the FEMA trailers to heat
water for the showers and once heated, hot water only was
available for a few minutes. Limited access to hot water, as
well as overcrowding, has contributed to less than ideal
hygiene. The BRCHP medical providers reported that
these conditions are associated with frequent outbreaks of
impetigo, methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA), abscesses, and tinea corporis and capitis.
Most Louisiana Medicaid recipients are enrolled in the
managed care program known as Community Care. As of
December 2006, nearly one year and six months after
Hurricane Katrina, 68% of Louisiana’s Medicaid recipients
were in Community Care.29 Upon enrollment in the
Community Care Medicaid Program, the family has 30
days to select a primary care provider or, if not selected, one
is generated automatically. Then, the family is informed by
mail of their assigned primary care provider. This process
continues to be in place despite the disruption and disloca-
tion of housing and unreliable receipt of mail in the FEMA
villages. Neither families nor other community providers
have been well-informed of the processes or requirements
of enrolling with Medicaid and Community Care. Many
families were dropped from Louisiana Medicaid when they
were moved out-of-state immediately following Hurricane
Katrina. Others were dropped when they did not follow
new guidelines requiring annual recertification.
Issues around primary care provider designation rou-
tinely interrupted continuity of care and have been a barri-
er to receipt of pediatric sub-specialty care. When referrals
to a specialist could be made, transportation has been a sig-
nificant barrier to access.Transportation is included in fed-
erally mandated Medicaid benefits as an enabling service,
but many families had reported to BRCHP staff that the
Medicaid transportation available to them was unreliable.
Patients had been told by the Medicaid Transport dispatch
for the Baton Rouge area that efficient, non-emergency,
medical transportation is “not guaranteed.” One family, for
example, had requested transportation 48 hours in advance,
as required, but was not picked up for transport to the spe-
cialist on three consecutive attempts.
There are further limitations on the utility of this
Medicaid transportation service. In many instances, medic-
aid transport could not be used to cross Parish lines, ren-
dering it useless to Katrina evacuee families who were
referred to hospitals offering specialty care, since these
be used for therapeutic play. Both mobile units are staffed by
experienced, professionally licensed clinicians.
Co-location of pediatric and mental health providers is
an evidence-based method to improve access to mental
health services in a coordinated, integrated way. There are
many advantages to co-location: (1) patients who come to
the medical unit often are screened and referred for co-exist-
ing mental health problems or crisis intervention; (2) patients
who are referred for mental health assessment by school offi-
cials and others often are referred to the medical unit for
untreated medical conditions; and (3) clients who have a
positive relationship with the medical unit’s pediatrician
are more likely to seek mental health services. Children
taking psychotropic medications have more frequent access
to a medical doctor in managing their medication. The
integrative team approach encourages a larger, more holis-
tic perspective in how problems are viewed by clinicians.
Continuity of care is ensured as team members are available
to communicate frequently regarding patient care.
Medical and mental health services initially focused on
acute care needs and arranging for the management of
chronic conditions, some of which were newly diagnosed.
For other patients, access to care, including prescription
medications, had been disrupted. Mental health needs
changed over time. In addition to initial acute care needs,
new problems emerged including domestic violence, sub-
stance abuse, depression, and school problems, both behav-
ioral and academic. Many of these became chronic, and
long-term care needs were anticipated.
Medical Needs of the Children and Families 
Initially after Hurricane Katrina, the predominant pedi-
atric conditions were similar to those found in a routine
pediatric practice, such as upper respiratory infections, ear
infections, allergic rhinitis, and dermatological conditions.
The treatment and management of children with chronic
medical conditions such as asthma was challenging. Most
children were under-medicated. For example, children with
moderate or severe asthma commonly lacked controller
medication due to expired prescriptions, being dropped
from Medicaid enrollment, inability to afford medications,
or having lost their Medicaid cards.These children frequent-
ly had symptoms consistent with previously undiagnosed and
unaddressed allergic rhinitis and/or sinus irritation due to
formaldehyde exposure. The BRCHP medical team has
worked with families of these children to provide the most
effective medications and management practices for pre-
vention and control of chronic medical conditions.
The precise etiology of common pediatric acute condi-
tions also has proven unusually difficult to identify and
treat. For example, some caregivers report their children,
including very young children, complain of daily headaches
and/or chronic stomachaches.These symptoms are consistent
with somatic indicators of post-traumatic stress reactions, but
also could be manifestations of the well-documented elevated
formaldehyde levels in the trailers provided by FEMA.
Clinical concern emerged about the inadequacy of chil-
dren’s diets. Interventions provided by the BRCHP med-
ical providers have included education to increase the
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severely compromised their sense of trust and comfort. For
adults, the protracted loss of extended family and commu-
nity undermined their typical support system and exacer-
bated their depression and sense of isolation.
On mental health assessment, the children coming for
care from Renaissance Village presented with varying lev-
els of exposure to trauma following Hurricane Katrina.
Some children had a previously diagnosed mental disorder
for which they had not received treatment. Those who had
been in treatment experienced a disruption of care follow-
ing their displacement. The impact of the disaster on child
mental health had been, in part, attributable to the prior
limited availability of mental health services. This has led
to extended periods of time during which children did not
receive necessary evaluations and interventions. In addi-
tion, nearly every child in this population reported at least
one loss, through death or displacement, of an extended
family member. Often, children reported that at least one
relative’s whereabouts still were unknown. Some children
reported witnessing the death of a loved one during the
disaster. The most immediate impacts of these losses were
the associated symptoms of shock and grief.
The range of mental health and case management ser-
vices provided through the BRCHP CSRU also included:
1. Outreach to help people become aware of the service
and to improve adherence with appointments;
2. Individual interventions, including play therapy and
other non-verbal methods of expression, storytelling,
and art therapy;
3. Relaxation training and guided imagery to teach
coping strategies by utilizing a client’s strengths and
natural resiliency;
4. Group interventions to allow participants to share
experiences with their peers and reduce isolation;
5. Family Interventions including education about dis-
aster preparedness, consultation regarding behavior
management in the home, linkages with other ser-
vices, and referrals to another clinician on the men-
tal health team for more intensive support;
6. Service delivery in non-traditional settings, such as
enrichment camps for displaced children;
7. Pharmacotherapy to enhance the management of
moderate-severe symptoms, most commonly severe
hyperactivity, anxiety, and depression;
8. School- and community-based activities; and
9. Collaboration, coordination, collateral visits, and case
management.
Utilization of mental health services increased as feder-
ally funded services, under the auspices of FEMA, lost
funding and became unavailable. This process began about
one year after the hurricane, despite clear signs of contin-
ued and possibly increasing mental health needs in the
affected communities and particularly within the FEMA
villages. Within six months of these services closing, there
was a sharp increase in requests for mental health services
from the BRCHP mobile units by adults.
There were numerous reports by parents to mental
health providers of child sexual abuse perpetrated by neigh-
bors in the FEMA villages. Relocation to FEMA villages
facilities often are located in parishes other than those in
which FEMA trailer parks are sited. An additional prob-
lem with Medicaid transportation services in the Baton
Rouge area is that they may not be used to access necessary
non-medical services such as  supplemental nutrition pro-
grams, Head Start or other preschool programs, prenatal
support, and Social Security services.
Mental Health Needs of Children and Families
The BRCHP mental health staff consists of a clinical
social worker, two part-time, licensed psychologists, and a
part-time psychiatrist. Initially, they helped families with
immediate, concrete needs—food, water, shelter, etc.To the
extent possible, they provided support for teachers, social
workers, administrators, and nurses in the community, in
order to facilitate a safe outlet in which to express their
frustrations and sadness. The BRCHP mental health staff
provided a series of trainings for school professionals. The
trainings were intended to facilitate identification of chil-
dren whose behavior indicated the potential need for psy-
chological assessment and treatment.
Many children who presented to the MMU for medical
care were referred to the mental health unit for assessment
because of clear signs of psychological distress. The num-
ber of patients whose presenting problem was of a mental
health nature increased steadily. Initially, residents of the
FEMA trailer villages, even those with obvious mental
health needs, were reluctant to seek mental health services
partly because of concerns about stigma, and partly because
of mistrust of a mental health service not yet integrated
into the community. Over time, the number of patients
requiring counseling for varying degrees of acute psycho-
logical distress increased.This change may not represent an
increase in prevalence, but rather a clearer view of the
extent of problems that had been obscured by resistance to
this new mental health service. It also may reflect the fact
that immediately following a disaster, people focus on
meeting daily survival needs before they can address any
mental health issues.
A frequent presenting problem from parents seeking
mental health services was help with new-onset emotional
and behavioral problems in their children.The most frequent
presenting problems for school-age children were a disruptive
behavioral disorder and academic under-achievement. As
treatment progressed, BRCHP providers found that these
symptoms frequently were related to underlying depression,
anxiety disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Among
adolescents and adults, the BRCHP mental health staff
reported frequent diagnoses of mood and anxiety disorders.
Parents increasingly reported feeling overwhelmed,
hopeless, anxious, and depressed. One of the most signifi-
cant consequences of the hurricane and its aftermath on
children, their parents, and the professionals caring for
them, has been the impact of separation, relocation, and
uncertainty about the future. Many children were confused
and unclear as to what was going on. They had been taken
from place to place without explanation, sometimes sepa-
rated from their families. At least initially, they were not
able to count on any reliable caregiver, which, as expected,
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deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) by a child
psychiatrist pre-Hurricane Katrina. His father had a
history of incarceration and his mother gave him to
his paternal grandparents. JK and his grandparents
relocated to Renaissance Village in Baton Rouge
after the hurricane and flooding. The grandparents
had a number of unaddressed medical and mental
health needs, such as diabetes (grandmother), pain
and disability from a recent accident and surgery
(grandfather), depression, anxiety, and poor oral
health, including dental abscesses. Staff from the
BRCHP arranged, among other things, for the
grandparents to receive emergency dental care at a
local primary care clinic site. After two weeks, the
grandparents had reduced anxiety and were able to
focus more of their energy on the needs of JK. They
have since returned to New Orleans and have recon-
nected with their now re-established medical and
mental health providers.
2. AB is a 12-year-old African-American male whose
description of a drawing he made typifies the feel-
ings of many children we have encountered:
“The purple is for the people who stayed in the
storm, the red is for the people in my family who
died in the storm, green (the predominant color) is
for all the white people who are making money off
of us, and yellow is for the people of New Orleans
who are only getting a little bit of money.”
He was living in a FEMA trailer park when he made
this statement.
3. RS, a father who had evacuated through chest-deep
water with his two young sons, asked for help with
his youngest child. For their safety, he had put the
children on objects floating in the water, pushing
them ahead of him to keep them from being sepa-
rated until they reached dry land. After a while, the
father realized that the youngest child was floating
atop a dead body. The child was diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder.
4. MN, an elementary school boy, presented with mul-
tiple medical and social issues. Psychological evalua-
tion revealed borderline intellectual functioning and
confirmed ADHD. Evaluation and recommenda-
tions were presented to his school, but unfortunately,
he was expelled before a special education evaluation
was completed. Medical issues included moderate-
to-severe asthma, allergic rhinitis, atopic dermatitis,
and tinea capitis. MN suffers from physical and
medical neglect and the medical and mental health
providers advocated on his behalf with children’s ser-
vices and the truancy office. MN’s father recently was
killed in a violent incident. His mother, whose par-
enting skills were limited before that loss, has had
increasing difficulty with tasks of daily living. An
open-door policy was maintained for MN, and he
often has walk-in therapy sessions. His older siblings
were asked to get him medical care. After an incident
that almost led to the family’s expulsion from the
FEMA trailer village, MN’s mother agreed to work
entails parents’ loss of control over the environment in
which they will raise their children. Parents also have
expressed a pervasive sense of lawlessness in the FEMA
villages. This is in large part due to jurisdictional disputes
about which law enforcement entity should respond to
problems. The FEMA officials have limited ability to
intervene in criminal behavior of any type and the local
police are reluctant to get involved in crime occurring with-
in the FEMA-controlled village. This hands-off policy
from law enforcement, also shared by child protection
agencies, leaves parents feeling unprotected. Parents have
reported reluctance to let their children go outside to play.
There is a valid concern that their children may become
prey to sexual predators.
Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, the Baton Rouge sher-
iff ’s office requested a list of FEMA shelter residents to check
whether any known sex offenders were included.The FEMA
refused to turn over such lists, citing privacy issues.30 It has
been estimated that the whereabouts of as many as 2,000 reg-
istered sex offenders were unknown after Hurricane
Katrina.31 In a report issued nearly two years after Hurricane
Katrina by the Department of Homeland Security Office of
the Inspector General, FEMA reiterated its general refusal to
share information about shelter residents with law enforce-
ment entities, citing the Privacy Act of 1974.32
Teenagers experienced the stress of losing their primary
peer groups. In weekly support groups at Renaissance Village,
they reminisced about favorite meeting places in their New
Orleans neighborhoods and friends from whom they were
separated.They also reported experiencing stigma from their
new community as they tried to integrate into new schools
and frequent territorial battles with youth from Baton Rouge.
They expressed anxiety about their family possibly being
evicted from the FEMA village and about whether they ever
will be able to return to their former communities.
Substance abuse seems to have increased over time
among the Renaissance Village residents. Teenagers and
adults frequently used marijuana and crack cocaine; some,
including many parents, began to use alcohol to excess.The
BRCHP mental health staff has interpreted this, in many
cases, as an effort at self-medication for mood and anxiety
disorders as well as an attempt to cope with stress. Some of
the adult patients seen through the BRCHP mental health
unit were relapsing into alcoholism due to the stress created
by the hurricane-related trauma and ongoing displacement.
It has been especially important to include learning
assessments for children and adolescents receiving mental
health services because those identified as possibly needing
special education often faced a lengthy delay being evaluat-
ed through the school system. There were not enough psy-
chologists working for the Baton Rouge area schools systems
for timely processing of these referrals.
Case Vignettes 
In each of the following cases, patient initials have been
used and demographics have been changed to preserve pri-
vacy and confidentiality.
1. JK is a school-age, obese male from New Orleans
who had been receiving treatment for attention
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the day also marked the first day that OP’s husband,
who had continued his pre-hurricane job in New
Orleans, had to stop commuting back to that city
and began a job in Baton Rouge. The cost of gas was
prohibitive. Having to abandon hope of restoring
prior ties with New Orleans because of financial
pressures has become common two years after
Hurricane Katrina.
The realization that they may not be able to go back
home and restore the life they had previously led is a con-
tributing factor to the continuation of post-disaster mental
health problems for the affected populations.
Conclusions
The development of mental health programs during and
following a disaster requires a commitment to provide ser-
vices over time. The initial phase is likely to be marked by
under-utilization of mental health services for several rea-
sons: (1) there is a priority to meet concrete survival needs
before dealing with stress, mood, and anxiety reactions; (2)
resistance to requesting mental health services, including
concern about stigma, remains strong; and (3) it is neces-
sary to establish one’s presence as a reliable and trustwor-
thy service provider in the community before expecting
that people will come forward to discuss their most per-
sonal needs and concerns.
To the extent possible, co-locating mental health ser-
vices with medical services is an effective way to facilitate
mental health utilization. Seeking medical care may be per-
ceived as a more acceptable point of entry for mental health
services. Many patients have medical and mental health
problems that must to be addressed, and co-location allows
for fewer visits and better adherence with appointments.
Also, it is likely that following a disaster, healthcare rela-
tionships will have been disrupted, and medical services
will be needed independent of any mental health concerns.
The services described generally are useful for isolated
and underserved patient populations without access to
health care. This includes not only post-disaster popula-
tions, but also rural, migrant, homeless, linguistic, and cul-
tural minority, and underserved inner city populations.
Barriers to care may include poor transportation, health
professional shortages, and lack of adequate health insur-
ance. This model of using mobile units to deliver medical
and mental health services has proven effective to bridge
barriers to access for these diverse populations during the
past 20 years throughout The Children’s Health Fund (CHF)
National Network, which now comprises 21 programs in
14 states and the District of Columbia.
The Baton Rouge Children’s Health Project was devel-
oped as a response to the hurricane-related disaster affect-
ing several Louisiana communities. It has become a part of
the healthcare infrastructure of these communities, and,
like all other CHF projects, will remain in place as long as
the need exists.
with the on-site child and adolescent psychiatrist.
MN’s  teenage brother, LN, aged 16 years, had par-
ticipated in the Transitioning Teens group. When
recently questioned by the pediatrician regarding
conflicts at his high school between Baton Rouge
and New Orleans students, LN reported “we’re
straight now—there’s no problem.”
5. SM is a 5-year-old female who initially was treated
at the Mobile Medical Unit for chronic ear pain,
middle ear effusion, and allergic rhinitis. CM, her 4-
year-old brother, was evaluated at the MMU after
being discharged from the hospital following a sus-
pected intentional poisoning by another trailer vil-
lage resident. During the course of their respective
evaluations, it was discovered that their mother, JM,
had been suffering from extreme anxiety, depression,
insomnia, and neuropathic pain after having survived
multiple stab wounds inflicted by her husband, the
father of the children. JM expressed guilt and self-
blame for not being able to access appropriate men-
tal health services for her husband post-Katrina, and
for pressing charges that had resulted in his incarcer-
ation. The medical and mental health team worked
together to address her needs. Because she expressed
that her primary concern was the safety and well-
being of her children, emphasis was placed on the
importance of self-care. JM reported improved sleep
at night after just her first session. Subsequent ses-
sions occurred inside her temporary housing, a trail-
er, where she was living with her boyfriend and chil-
dren, because of continued threats from the youth
that previously had been suspected in having poi-
soned CM. JM and her boyfriend were linked with
other medical and mental health services in the com-
munity who interfaced on their behalf with law
enforcement, FEMA security, and others.
6. On the second anniversary of Hurricane Katrina,
OP, a 23-year-old mother, brought her 10-month-
old infant to the Community Support and Resiliency
Unit (CSRU), requesting to see a pediatrician for a
minor medical problem. The driver noted the moth-
er’s degree of agitation and arranged for an emer-
gency session with the Clinical Social Worker
(CSW). She reported that the previous day, a voice
had told her to threaten someone at Renaissance
Village with a knife. OP currently was concerned
that if the voices got any worse, she might hurt her
baby. Another of her children with chronic medical
problems, she said, had died during Hurricane
Katrina. OP was assessed to have had a full-blown
psychotic episode, with command hallucinations.
The CSW contacted the staff psychiatrist who wrote
an emergency medical order and had OP hospital-
ized that same day. While the anniversary of the hur-
ricane was a trigger event in this psychotic episode,
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